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We welcome Cho and Wu’s (1) sugges-
tion that the study of auditory verbal
hallucinations (AVHs) could be improved
by contrasting and testing more explana-
tory models. However, we have some wor-
ries both about their criticisms of inner
speech-based self-monitoring (ISS) models
and whether their proposed spontaneous
activation (SA) model is explanatory.
Cho and Wu rightly point out that some
phenomenological aspects of inner speech
do not seem concordant with phenome-
nological aspects of AVH; Langdon et al.
(2) found that, while many AVHs took the
third person form (“he/she”), this was a
relatively rare occurrence in inner speech,
both for patients with a diagnosis of schiz-
ophrenia who experienced AVHs and con-
trol participants. This is indeed somewhat
problematic for ISS models, notwithstand-
ing potential problems with the introspec-
tive measures used in the above study.
However, Cho and Wu go on to ask: “how
does inner speech in one’s own voice with
its characteristic features become an AVH
of, for example, the neighbor’s voice with
its characteristic features?” (p. 2). Here, it
seems that Cho and Wu simply assume
that inner speech is always experienced
in one’s own voice, and are not aware of
research suggesting that the presence of
other people’s voices is exactly the kind of
quality reported in typical inner speech. For
example, McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough
(3) showed that it is common for healthy,
non-clinical participants to report hearing
other voices as part of their inner speech, as
well as to report their inner speech taking
on the qualities of a dialogic exchange. This
is consistent with Vygotskian explanations
of the internalization of external dialogs
during psychological development (4). In
this light, no “transformation” from one’s
own voice to that of another is needed,
and no “additional mechanism” needs to
be added to the ISS model (5).
In any case, this talk of transformation
is misleading. There is no experience of
inner speech first, which is then somehow
transformed. The question about whether
inner speech is implicated in AVHs is about
whether elements involved in the produc-
tion of inner speech experiences are also
involved in the production of some AVHs.
There seems to be fairly strong evidence to
support this.
That inner speech involves motoric ele-
ments has been empirically supported by
several electromyographical (EMG) stud-
ies [e.g., Ref. (6)]. Later experiments
made the connection between inner speech
and AVH, showing that similar muscu-
lar activation is involved in AVH (7,
8). The involvement of inner speech in
AVH is further supported by the find-
ings from Gould (9), who showed that
when his subjects hallucinated, subvocal-
izations occurred which could be picked
up with a throat microphone. These sub-
vocalizations were causally responsible for
the AVHs, and not just echoing them
(as has been hypothesized to happen in
some cases of verbal comprehension [cf.
e.g., Ref. (10)]) was suggested by Bick
and Kinsbourne (11), who demonstrated
that if people experiencing hallucina-
tions opened their mouths wide, stopping
vocalizations, then the majority of AVHs
stopped.
Cho and Wu argue that ISS models are
no better than SA models at explaining the
specificity of AVHs to specific voices and
content; we would argue that an ISS model,
with recognition that inner speech is more
complex than one’s own voice speaking in
the first person, explains more than the SA
model, because it explains why voices with
a specific phenomenology are experienced
in the first place, as opposed to more ran-
dom auditory experiences that might be
expected from SA in auditory cortex. The
appeal to individual differences in gamma
synchrony as an underlying mechanism of
SA also does not seem capable of explain-
ing why this would lead to activations of
specific voice representations.
Cho and Wu go on to say that “once we
allow that a given episode of AVH involves
the features of another person’s voice with
its characteristic acoustic features, it is sim-
ple to explain why the patient misattributes
the event to another person: that is what it
sounds like”(p. 2). Taken to its extreme, this
implies that any episode of inner speech
that involves a voice other than one’s own
would be experienced as “non-self”, and
hence experienced as similar to an AVH,
a proposition that would clearly not find
much support in empirical research. Tak-
ing this view, it is the SA model that needs
an additional mechanism to explain why
neuronal representations of other people’s
voices are experienced not just as sounding
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like someone else’s voice, but also having
the non-self-generated, alien quality associ-
ated with AVHs. This is exactly the type
of mechanism built into ISS models of
AVHs.
Indeed, the authors do go on to argue
that many problems with the inner speech
model of AVHs can be solved if we stop
referring to “inner speech”, and instead
refer to “auditory imagination”, which,
supposedly, is characterized by actual
acoustical properties, unlike inner speech
(the authors do not cite any literature
to support this claim). We would argue
that this falls within the realm of typi-
cal inner speech, and that the view put
forward by Cho and Wu is based on
unexamined assumptions about the typi-
cal form of inner speech. We would argue
that a separate “type” of imagery is not
needed, and it is probable that inner speech
recruits at least some mechanisms of audi-
tory imagery. Therefore, it does not make
sense to argue that AVHs resemble one, but
not the other.
Finally, it should be pointed out that
auditory cortical regions are not the only
areas reported to lead to AVHs when
directly stimulated; for example, Bancaud
et al. (12) reported that stimulating the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), an area
often associated with error monitoring
and cognitive control, caused auditory hal-
lucinations, a finding that seems more
compatible with self-monitoring accounts
of AVH. Admittedly, it is possible that
stimulation of ACC could have distal
effects, also stimulating auditory cortical
regions; we mention this finding simply
to highlight the fact that the potential
top–down effects of other brain regions
on auditory cortical areas should not be
overlooked.
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